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Abstract
We consider how one party can induce another party to join an inter-
national emission compact given private information. Due to multilateral
externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to in-
centivize the agent. This leads to a number of non-standard features:
Optimal contracts can include a boundary part, which is not a copy of
the no contract outcome. Compared to this, a contract can increase emis-
sions of the principal for ine¢ cient types, and reduce his payo⁄for e¢ cient
types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing and turn negative,
i.e., the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.
Keywords: private information, multilateral externalities, mecha-
nism design, restricted contracts, environmental agreements.
JEL: D82, Q54, H87
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyse optimal incentive contracts characterized by asymmet-
ric information and multilateral externalities. The presentation focuses on the
example of international climate change negotiations. However, several further
applications exist such as ￿shing, transboundary pollution, common water re-
sources as well as joint ventures and other team problems for which the output
depends on the overall e⁄ort or investment level.
One of the most important issues of ongoing climate negotiations is how
industrialized countries can induce developing countries to accept a contract in
￿The authors acknowledge helpful comments from Fuhai Hong, Jon Strand and others
after presenting a ￿rst draft at the Fourth World Congress of Environmental and Resource
Economists, June 28 to July 2, 2010, Montreal, Canada as well as from Andreas Novak, Jun
Honda and Klaus Eisenack.
yUniversity of Oldenburg, Department of Economics and Law, 26111 Oldenburg, Germany,
phone +49 441 798-4113, fax +49 441 798-4116, carsten.helm@uni.oldenburg.de.
zUniversity of Vienna, Center of Business Studies, Br￿nnerstr. 72, 1210 Wien, Austria,
franz.wirl@univie.ac.at.
1which both sides commit to binding emission targets. These negotiations are
aggravated by the fact that countries have private information, especially about
their costs of emissions ￿ respectively their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for abate-
ment ￿ , which they present strategically in order to negotiate more favorable
terms for themselves. Contract theory appears as an obvious tool to investigate
this issue. In particular, we use the principal-agent model which assumes com-
plete bargaining power of the principal, unilateral asymmetric information and
binding agreements.
Obviously, these are strong simpli￿cations of the rather complex climate
change negotiations, which we now motivate in turn. First, most observers
would agree that industrialized countries are in a ￿rst-mover position and have
more bargaining power than developing countries. Second, there is probably less
information about the WTP in developing countries for several reasons: there
exists less reliable scienti￿c studies about the damages from climate change
and the adaptation potential, the public press is less well developed, political
processes are less transparent, and there is less domestic action which may reveal
the underlying preferences (M￿ler 1989).
Third, although the Kyoto Protocol lacks a stringent enforcement mecha-
nism (Finus 2008), this has become an important issue for the negotiations of
a Post-Kyoto Protocol; and there are other examples of binding international
agreements such as the WTO/GATT or the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Moreover, especially economists often argue that
an international system of tradable permits should become a cornerstone of a
successful climate change policy. Obviously, to prevent participants from over-
selling permits such a system needs a credible enforcement mechanism; hence it
presumes the possibility of binding agreements.
Given this assumption, the non-cooperative coalition theory approach (e.g.,
Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994), which is perhaps the most widely
used approach to analyse international environmental agreements (IEAs), would
predict the ￿rst-best solution. This would also be the outcome of a standard
coalition model with only two-players. The reason is that the ine¢ cient solution
that usually results in these models is driven by the interaction of the countries￿
strategic participation decisions without commitment. By contrast, we assume
binding participation decisions so that this mechanism is absent in our model.
Instead, ine¢ ciencies are caused by private information. To analyse this, a two-
player setup is su¢ cient and strengthens the focus. Given the complexity of
the analysis and the novelty of this approach, it seems a reasonable ￿rst pass to
better understand the strategic e⁄ects of private information in the negotiation
of climate treaties.
The prevalence of uncertainty in the climate change context has been widely
acknowledged and several papers examine its implications for the negotiation
of IEAs (e.g., Kolstad 2007; Morath 2010). However, applications of contract
theory with its focus on asymmetric information are rare, although this has
been pointed out as a valuable extension long ago (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco
1993, 327). An exception are Caparr￿s, PØreau, and Tazda￿t (2004), who con-
sider a bargaining model in which Northern countries negotiate about transfers
2in exchange for a given level of emission reductions from Southern countries,
which have private information about the minimum amount of transfers that
they would accept. There is also a literature that analyses the role of private
information about emission reduction projects for joint implementation and the
clean development mechanism (e.g., Hagem (1996), Montero (2000), Fischer
(2005)). For the case of sulphur emissions in Europe, Huber and Wirl (1996)
consider the optimal incentive contract between a West European country (the
principal) that faces high damages and an East European country (the agent)
that has high emissions.
Apart from the analysis of climate change negotiations, we contribute to
the contract theory literature by extending the principal-agent model to an
environment of multilateral externalities between the principal and the agent.
This allows the principal to use not only the standard instrument of subsidies
to incentivize the agent, but also her own emissions. An additional consequence
of multilateral externalities is that the agent￿ s outside option depends on his
type (e.g., his WTP for emission abatement) because it a⁄ects the players￿
strategic interaction in the case of contract failure. This leads to countervailing
incentives (Lewis and Sappington 1989). On the one, the agent has an incentive
to overstate his costs of climate damages in order to get a higher compensation.
On the other hand, he wants to understate his costs in order to pretend a better
outside option. In combination, these e⁄ects of multilateral externalities lead
to a number of results that di⁄er from the standard screening model ￿such as
the non-linear pricing problem.
Type-dependent outside options have also been analysed in other papers.
For a general analysis see Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) and Jullien (2000).
Related applications from environmental economics are Wirl and Huber (2005a,
2005b) as well as Huber and Wirl (1998), where a pollutee (the principal) of-
fers the polluter a subsidy in exchange for a reduction in pollution. McKelvey
and Page (2002) consider a similar setting but focus on bargaining outcomes.
Although these studies also consider externalities, they are only unilateral from
the agent to the principal. Segal (1999) analyses multilateral externalities, but
these are restricted to a set of n ￿ 2 agents, which are o⁄ered a contract by
the principal (see also Gomes (2005), Genicot and Ray (2006)). Accordingly,
in both cases there is no externality from the principal to the agent, which is
crucial for our paper.
A particular feature of this combination of multilateral externalities and type
dependent reservation prices is that an ￿ interior boundary￿solution can be part
of the optimal contract. More precisely, types receiving a (boundary) contract
whose payo⁄ equals their reservation price are prescribed (interior) emissions
that di⁄er from the no contract solution. Intuitively, by reallocating emissions so
as to equalize marginal abatement costs the principal can raise the joint surplus
and use this to pay subsidies. Further surprising properties can characterize
the optimal contract: First, although contracts raise the principal￿ s expected
payo⁄, she may loose from contracts with e¢ cient types. Second, subsidies can
be negative, i.e. the agent is asked to reduce emissions yet pays the principal for
issuing this order. Third, subsidies can decline in the e¢ ciency of the agent or,
3respectively, increase with emissions so that countries which reduce emissions
less are rewarded by higher monetary payments. Finally, emissions and subsidies
in the optimal contract allocation can be implemented alternatively by a system
of competitive permit trading.
The outline of the remaining paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 considers the reference situations of no contracts and Pareto-
e¢ cient cooperation. Section 4 analyses the optimal contract, and section 5
its alternative implementation via tradable permits. Section 6 analyses some
properties of the optimal contract in more detail and discusses a speci￿c exam-
ple. Finally, section 7 concludes by interpreting the main results in the climate
change context. An appendix contains all proofs.
2 The model
We analyse contractual mitigation of a global public bad with heterogenous
damages that are private information. Speci￿cally, consider two groups of coun-
tries ￿say industrialized and developing ￿signing an emission compact. The
two players (countries) are indexed alternatively by i;j = 1;2; i 6= j, where
we always use subscript 1 for the principal (￿ she￿ ) and subscript 2 for the agent
(￿ he￿ ). Countries have bene￿ts Bi (xi), which are increasing and strictly concave
in their own emissions, xi 2 R+, and satisfy the Inada conditions. In addition,
they face costs ￿iD(X) that are strictly increasing and convex in aggregate
emissions, X := x1+x2, and also depend on a country-speci￿c damage parame-
ter ￿i 2 (0;1]. When we consider emission reductions, we often refer to B0
i (xi)
as the marginal cost of emission abatement and to ￿iD0 (X) as the marginal
bene￿t of abatement. A country￿ s payo⁄ from emissions is
Vi := Bi (xi) ￿ ￿iD(X); i = 1;2: (1)
We assume that the bene￿t functions, Bi (xi), and the damage function,
D(X), are common knowledge. In the climate change context, this could be
interpreted as information that is publicly available from the IPCC or other
sources. However, governments may have additional private information about
the (anticipated) damages in their own country. Moreover, one can interpret ￿i
more broadly as a valuation parameter that determines a country￿ s WTP for
abatement, which depends not only on physical damages, but also on the prefer-
ences of voters and politicians or lobbying activities. In the context of interna-
tional environmental agreements the resulting WTP of industrialized countries
is often much better known than that of developing countries for the reasons
mentioned in the introduction.
We capture this in a stylized way by assuming that the principal￿ s valuation
parameter is common knowledge, and normalize it to ￿1 = 1.1 By contrast, the
1Otherwise, the reservation price of the agent depends also on the principal￿ s private infor-
mation parameter. In this case, it is either optimal for the principal to conceal or to reveal the
type (Maskin and Tirole 1990). The following results extend to bilateral private information
only if the latter applies.
4agent￿ s valuation ￿ := ￿2 is private information with a known distribution: f
denotes the density with support [￿;1], F the cumulative distribution function,
and h := f=(1 ￿ F) the hazard rate that is assumed to be increasing in ￿, i.e.,
_ h > 0 (throughout the text we use dots to refer to the (total) derivative w.r.t.
￿). Before we turn to the optimal contract, we determine the ￿rst-best solution
and the outcome without contracts as reference points.
3 Emissions: ￿rst-best and out-of-contract
3.1 First-best emissions
First-best emissions, indicated by superscripts 1, follow from maximizing the
aggregate payo⁄ V1 + V2. They satisfy Samuelson￿ s rule for public goods that
the sum of countries￿marginal bene￿ts from emission abatement (the public
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X1￿
; i = 1;2: (2)













(1 + ￿)D00 < 0; i;j = 1;2; j 6= i: (3)
so that the principal￿ s and the agent￿ s emissions are both decreasing in ￿. Intu-
itively, higher damages are associated with less emissions.
3.2 Out-of-contract emissions
In the non-cooperative solution without contracts, each country chooses its emis-
sions as a best response to those of the other country. Two reasonable speci￿-
cation of the timing exist: (i) countries choose their emissions simultaneously
(Cournot scenario), or (ii) country 1 (the principal) acts as leader and chooses
its emissions ￿rst (Stackelberg scenario). The Cournot scenario is more widely
used in the climate change literature. However, the Stackelberg scenario is more
in line with the principal-agent framework, in which the principal can commit
herself to a certain emission level.
In both cases, the agent￿ s emissions contingent on the principal￿ s choice of
emissions and his type are (superscripts 0 indicate the non-cooperative solution)
x0
2 (x1;￿) = argmax
x2


















2 ￿ ￿D00 2 (￿1;0]: (5)
Accordingly, an increase of the principal￿ s emissions (weakly) lowers the
agent￿ s emissions but below the principal￿ s expansion.
5The principal does not know the agent￿ s valuation ￿ so that _ x0
1 = 0. In
particular, she takes a Bayesian perspective and maximizes her (expected) payo⁄

















































In the latter case, the agent (weakly) reduces his emissions in response to
emissions of the principal (by 5) who, therefore, chooses (weakly) higher emis-
sions than in the Cournot scenario. However, for the case of linear damage costs
that we consider in section 6, D00 = 0 so that @x0
2=@x1 = 0; and the Cournot
and Stackelberg outcome coincide. This re￿ ects that with constant marginal
damages countries￿non-cooperative emission choices are independent of each
other.
Aggregate emissions will always exceed the ￿rst-best. The reason is that
each player and consequently also player 1 accounts just for own harm, and any
strategically motivated increase will only be inadequately compensated by player
2 due to (5). However, one can think of scenarios where player 2￿ s emission as
a consequence of a strategic Stackelberg move of high emissions falls below his
￿rst-best allocation.
4 Optimal contract
We now turn to the analysis of the optimal contract, using the standard assump-
tion that the principal makes a take-it-or-leave o⁄er to the agent. In particular,
the principal writes a contract fx1 (￿);x2 (￿);s(￿);￿ 2 [￿;1]g; specifying emis-






[B1 (x1 (￿)) ￿ D(x1 (￿) + x2 (￿)) ￿ s(￿)]dF (￿): (9)
6This optimization faces the usual incentive compatibility and participation
constraints. The revelation principle ensures that one can restrict attention to
contracts inducing agents to tell the truth. Let ￿ denote the true and ^ ￿ the
reported type, then incentive compatibility requires































is the payo⁄of a type ￿ who pretends to be of type ^ ￿. This implies the following









































Evaluated at ^ ￿ = ￿ this is called the "local incentive compatibility con-
straint", which can also be written in terms of the agent￿ s payo⁄ U (￿) as
_ U (￿) = ￿D(x1 (￿) + x2 (￿)) < 0: (IC)
If the agent declines the o⁄ered contract, then the out-of-contract solution
as described in section 3.2 obtains. Accordingly, the agent￿ s participation (or
individual rationality) constraint is
U (￿) ￿ R(￿) := max
x2





8￿ 2 [￿;1]; (IR)
where the principal￿ s choice x0
1 follows from (7) or (8), depending on whether
one assumes Cournot or Stackelberg interaction. The envelope theorem implies










and thus a reservation price that declines in the agent￿ s type.
It is well known (see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)) that the princi-
pal￿ s problem of ￿nding the optimal contract can be stated equivalently as max-
imizing the principal￿ s expected payo⁄(9) subject to the local incentive compat-
ibility constraint (IC), the participation constraint (IR), and the monotonicity
constraint, _ x2 (￿) ￿ 0. In contrast to the standard solution procedure, however,
we can not simply replace the general participation constraint by that of the
lowest (or highest) type because the agent￿ s outside option depends on his type.
No general results exist for this class of problems (Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare 1995). Therefore, several authors have used simplifying assumptions for
the reservation utility, e.g. that it changes linearly in the agent￿ s type (Lewis
and Sappington 1989; Feenstra and Lewis 1991). Such a simpli￿cation is not
feasible in our model because the out-of-contract solution and the associated
7reservation utility are determined endogenously. Hence we have to explicitly
account for the participation constraint (IR) over the whole range of types.
In conclusion, solving (11) at ^ ￿ = ￿ for s(￿) and substitution into (9), the
optimal contract is the solution of the following optimal control problem (xi are





[B1 (x1 (￿)) + B2 (x2 (￿)) ￿ (1 + ￿)D(X (￿)) ￿ U (￿)]f (￿)d￿;
(14)
subject to the ￿ dynamic￿constraint (IC), the ￿ state￿constraint (IR) and the
monotonicity constraint, _ x2 (￿) ￿ 0. The proposition below summarizes the
major properties of the optimal contract.
Proposition 1
(i) Abatement is undertaken cost-e⁄ectively, i.e.,
B0
1 (x1 (￿)) = B0
2 (x2 (￿)) for all ￿ 2 [￿;1]: (15)
(ii) Emissions of the principal and of the agent are above the ￿rst-best ￿except
at the top ￿and declining in ￿; i.e., _ xi < 0 for all ￿ 2 [￿;1];i = 1;2.
(iii) An interior solution of the contract (i.e., the participation constraint (IR)




i (￿)) ￿ (1 + g (￿))D0 (Xr (￿)) = 0; i = 1;2; (16)
where






￿ ￿, and _ g > 1: (17)
No interior solution exists for g(￿) ￿ ￿1.
(iv) A boundary solution of the contract (i.e., along which the participation
constraint (IR) is binding; identi￿ed by superscript b) is uniquely deter-
mined by (15) and
Xb (￿) = X0 (￿); (18)
i.e., aggregate emissions are the same as in the out-of-contract solution.
Yet individual emissions di⁄er, xb
i (￿) 6= x0
i (￿), and are below relaxed pro-
gram emissions, xb
i (￿) < xr
i (￿).
A proof is given in the appendix so that the following discussion can focus on
economic intuition. There are two ways to raise the overall surplus as compared
to the out-of-contract solution: ￿rst, increasing cost e⁄ectiveness by reducing
di⁄erences in marginal abatement costs; second, internalizing the externality by
reducing overall emissions. The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) depends
8only on aggregate emissions. Therefore, the principal uses the ￿rst instrument
to the full extent and allocates emissions so as to equalize marginal abatement
costs. By contrast, the optimal internalization of the externality depends on
the agent￿ s type. In a private information context, revealing this type requires
payment of an information rent, U(￿)￿R(￿), that accrues to the agent. Hence
internalization will be incomplete, which is re￿ ected in the di⁄erence ￿￿g (￿) ￿ 0
when comparing the relaxed program solution (16) with ￿rst-best (2). Only for
￿ = 1, which implies g(￿) = ￿, emissions are ￿rst-best.
The result that the contract binds for low types and ￿ = 1 is the e¢ cient
type crucially depends on the type-dependence of the agent￿ s outside option
R(￿). To see this, use (13) to write the incentive compatibility constraint (IC)
in terms of the agent￿ s information rent as





For the moment, suppose that the reservation value were constant for all ￿
(i.e., the second term would be cancelled on both sides). Then the informa-
tion rent would fall in ￿, which re￿ ects the agent￿ s incentive to overstate its
damages to obtain a higher compensation. However, once accounting for type-
dependence, the agent also has a countervailing incentive to understate ￿ so as
to pretend a better outside option. This e⁄ect suggests that the information
rent should increase in ￿, as it is re￿ ected in the positive second term on the
right-hand side of (19). Whenever the optimal contract (partly) internalizes the
externality so that X (￿) < X0 (￿), the second e⁄ect dominates.
As argued above, the principal gains from internalization so that the contract
binds from below. Moreover, in the standard relaxed program solution it would
bind only for the lowest type, while all others receive an information rent. If this
leads to overall emissions below those out-of-contract for all types, it will be the
optimal contract. However, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) requires
that lower types are associated with higher overall emissions. Therefore, it may
happen that relaxed program emissions exceed those out-of-contract. From
(16) this is the case if 1+g (￿) becomes su¢ ciently small, which depends on the
distribution of ￿.2 Obviously, the principal then prefers a boundary contract
in which overall emissions and the agent￿ s payo⁄ equal their respective values
out-of-contract.
From (19), this boundary contract satis￿es the agent￿ s participation and
monotonicity constraint. Hence types are revealed, and the principal can con-
dition individual emissions on ￿ so as to equalize marginal abatement costs.
Thereby she extracts at least the surplus that obtains from achieving cost-
e⁄ectiveness. Observe that this result crucially depends on the presence of
multilateral externalities, which allows the principal to reallocate individual
emissions without a⁄ecting their overall level and, therefore, the type-speci￿c
damages that determine incentive compatibility.
21+g (￿) can even be negative for certain speci￿cations, e.g., for linear increasing densities
(mode at ￿ = 1) that are su¢ ciently steep. In this case, no interior solution as given by (16)
exists because that would require negative marginal bene￿ts, which are ruled out by the Inada
assumptions.
9The preceding discussion already suggests that the interior and boundary
parts of the contract are joined at the type for which overall relaxed program
emissions are equal to those in the out-of-contract solution. To see that this is
actually the case, de￿ne with
￿IR := maxf￿0 : Xr(￿0) = X0(￿0)g (20)
the highest type at which aggregate relaxed program emissions, Xr, cross aggre-
gate out-of-contract emissions, X0.3 Observe that this crossing must be from
above because Xr(1) < X0(1) due to the ￿rst-best at ￿ = 1. Moreover, denote
by ￿m the ￿ marginal￿type at which the interior or relaxed program solution
(16) is joined with the boundary solution (15) and (18). In the appendix we
show that the optimization problem leads to a concave Hamiltonian which im-
plies that emissions of principal and agent are continuous functions of ￿. This
includes the marginal type so that
xb
i (￿m) = xr
i (￿m); i = 1;2: (21)
Remembering that Xb (￿) = X0 (￿), it follows that the marginal type ￿m,
if existing, is determined by the intersection of aggregate emissions under no
contract with the counterpart implied by the relaxed program, i.e., ￿m = ￿IR.
Proposition 2
(i) The boundary and interior parts of the optimal contract are joined at
￿m = ￿IR; (22)
and the relaxed program solution satis￿es the participation constraint for
all ￿ ￿ ￿m. At this junction not only aggregate but also the principal￿ s and
agent￿ s emissions are continuous. As a consequence, ￿IR > ￿ is necessary
and su¢ cient that a boundary solution applies to a subset of types.
(ii) Along the interior part of the optimal contract, overall emissions are below
their out-of-contract level.
(iii) However, emissions of either the principal or the agent can exceed their
out-of-contract level, along the boundary and interior parts of the optimal
contract.
3Although none or a unique intersection seems very intuitive (we could not construct a
contradicting example), the multilateral externalities make it hard to prove this property in
general and would require assumptions about third order derivatives and about the hazard
rate (more precisely, about _ g). If multiple crossings were existing (this requires at least three
since the last one must be from above and so is the ￿rst by the pole of xr
i) then segments of an
interior solution bordering on two boundary solutions cannot characterize an optimal contract
as this would lead to a discontinuity in U, violating incentive compatibility. Instead, the
optimal interior contract must be restricted to types above the last intersection, as expressed
in Proposition 2 below.
10Statement (ii) follows straightforwardly from the internalization of the ex-
ternality, but result (iii) is surprising. The reason is that high types care more
about emissions so that it becomes less attractive for them to underreport their
willingness-to-pay, ￿, if this triggers an increase of emissions. Therefore, the
principal can reduce the information rent by raising emissions for low types.
Moreover, from proposition 1 the allocation of overall emissions between the
two countries is governed solely by the equalization of marginal abatement costs.
Hence if the abatement cost functions are very asymmetric, one country may
undertake most of the abatement while the other has substantially higher emis-
sions. For the principal we have the additional e⁄ect that her out-of-contract
emissions are based on the expected type, while in the contract solution low
types are associated with higher emissions.
The agent￿ s payo⁄s associated with the optimal contract are illustrated in
Fig. 1 for a simple example of logarithmic bene￿ts, linear damages4 and a
uniform distribution,
B1 (x1) = lnx1; B2 (x2) = alnx2; D(X) = X; f (￿) =
1
1 ￿ ￿
; a > 0: (23)
The bold curve represents the agent￿ s contract payo⁄, the dashed curve the
hypothetical relaxed program payo⁄ for boundary types (Ur) and the out-of-
contract payo⁄ for interior types (R). At the junction of boundary and interior
solution, the payo⁄ associated with the relaxed program, denoted by Ur (and
thus only hypothetical to the left of ￿m), is more convex than R since
￿ Ur (￿m) = ￿D0 _ Xr (￿m) > ￿D0 _ X0 (￿m) = ￿ R(￿m) (24)
due to _ Xr (￿m) < _ X0 (￿m) < 0. Therefore, using U (￿m) = R(￿m) and _ U (￿m) =
_ R(￿m), R envelops Ur at ￿m.
5 Alternative implementation via permits
The optimal contract that we have described above (now indicated by super-
script c) speci￿es emissions and subsidies, fxc
1 (￿);xc
2 (￿);sc (￿);￿ 2 [￿;1]g. In
the following we show that the same allocation can be implemented by a di⁄er-
ent contract that speci￿es permit endowments, f!1 (￿);!2 (￿);￿ 2 [￿;1]g. From
a policy point of view this is interesting because a system of international permit
trading often features prominently in scenarios for a future climate policy.
It is well known that competitive permit trading equalizes marginal abate-
ment costs.5 Therefore, if the overall permit number equals overall emissions in
the optimal contract, i.e.,
!1 (￿) + !2 (￿) = Xc (￿); (25)
4Finus, Ierland, and Dellink (2006) show that discounted climate change damages that are
linear in emissions are a good approximation of the ￿gures in the DICE model (Nordhaus and
Yang 1996), which models damages as a non-linear function of the change in termperature.
5With only two countries competitive trading would result if permit endowments are for-
warded to ￿rms, an assumption that is widely used in the literature (e.g., Helm 2003).
11Figure 1: Agent￿ s payo⁄ with contract (U) and out-of-contract (R) for speci￿-
cation (23) with ￿ = 1
4, and a = 1
4.
then after-trade emissions are the same by proposition 1(i), i.e.,
x
p
1 (￿) = xc
1 (￿);x
p
2 (￿) = xc
2 (￿) for all ￿ 2 [￿;1]; (26)
where superscript p indicates the emissions after trading under the permit con-
tract. Using this, pro￿t maximization on the permit market implies an equilib-
rium permit price ￿p (￿) = B0
1 (xc
1 (￿)). Accordingly, if the permit endowment
of an agent of type ￿ solves
[!2 (￿) ￿ xc
2 (￿)]B0
1 (xc
1 (￿)) = sc (￿); (27)
then also the same transfers as in the original contract result. Given this equiv-
alence, the agent will truthfully reveal his type ￿.
Proposition 3 Emissions and transfers of the optimal contract can be imple-
mented alternatively by a competitive permit market with an endowment alloca-
tion that satis￿es (25) and (27).
It is interesting to note that the principal sets !2 (￿) ￿i.e. the agent￿ s decision
variable that it wants to regulate ￿so as to induce a subsidy target sc (￿); and
that she can do so without a⁄ecting the incentive compatibility constraint. This
is again a consequence of multilateral externalities due to which damages ￿and,
therefore, incentive compatibility ￿depend only on overall emissions. Hence the
principal can compensate changes in !2 (￿) by a corresponding change in her
own endowment !1 (￿).
12Figure 2: Emissions and subsidies for speci￿cation (23) with ￿ = 1
4, and a = 1.
6 Example and discussion of optimal contract
We now return to the contract in emissions and subsidies because it is more
similar to the standard screening contract. This facilitates a comparison and,
thereby, enables us to highlight some further non-standard features that arise
in contracting with multilateral externalities. These enable the principal to use
not only subsidies but also her emissions as an incentive instrument, which plays
a crucial role in the following elaborations.
In the discussion we will sometimes use the simple example (23). The payo⁄s
for a speci￿cation of this example (￿ = 0:25;a = 0:25) that leads to a contract
with an interior and boundary part have already been depicted in Figure 1. Fig-
ure 2 shows emissions and subsidies for equal abatement costs (a = 1) because
this simpli￿es the plots due to symmetric allocations of emissions. In this case,
the interior solution is globally optimal. The ￿gure also includes the allocation
of permits to the agent, !2 (￿), in a permit contract (see proposition 3). Al-
though the subsidy, s(￿), is constant across types, the number of permits that
the agents sells, !2 (￿) ￿ xr
2 (￿) is decreasing. This re￿ ects the higher permit
price as emissions are reduced.6
The constant subsidies imply that the principal relies exclusively on her
emissions to incentivize the agent. In the depicted speci￿cation this leads to
emissions of the principal which exceed their out-of-contract level for all ￿ < 0:5,
6An algebraic closed form solution for speci￿cation (23) including the permit allocation is
available upon request from the authors.
13an outcome that we have already discussed after proposition 2. We now analyse
more systematically the role of subsidies in the optimal contract. These follow
from (11) and (12) for ^ ￿ = ￿, which implies that their level and slope depend in
a non-trivial way on the type distribution and bene￿t functions. To disentangle
these e⁄ects, we sometimes impose a particularly simple assumption for one of
these determinants in order to focus on the other.
Proposition 4
(i) If ￿ has a uniform distribution, then along an interior solution,
￿B00
1 (xr
1 (￿)) T ￿B00
2 (xr
2 (￿)) () _ s S 0: (28)
(ii) Subsidies s(￿) can be positive, zero or negative, both along boundary and
interior solutions.
From the optimal contract we know that marginal bene￿ts of emissions are


















It follows that for a marginal increase of ￿ the reduction in emissions is
lower for the actor that has the higher jB00
i (xi)j. Intuitively, if the agent has
a steeper marginal bene￿t function ￿i.e., B00
2 (xr
2 (￿)) < B00
1 (xr
1 (￿)) ￿then his
marginal bene￿ts are adjusted over a smaller interval to assure that they remain
equalized for the higher ￿. Accordingly, the principal￿ s emissions are reduced by
more than those of the agent. The agent bene￿ts from this due to the externality
from the principal so that subsidies ￿the standard incentive instrument ￿ can
be reduced.
The example in ￿gure 2 depicts a situation with equal bene￿t functions. In
this case _ s = 0; hence the principal uses subsidies only to satisfy the lowest type￿ s
participation constraint, but not to incentivize the agent to reveal his type. In
a model without externalities this would contradict the revelation principle and
the implied incentive compatibility constraint. For example, in ￿gure 2 an agent
of type ￿ = 0:8 could pretend ^ ￿ ￿ 0:42, exercise his emission level outside the
contract, and still collect the constant subsidy s(^ ￿). This cheating, however, is
deterred by the implicit commitment to the principal￿ s emission, because then
she would also choose the higher emission level that corresponds to ^ ￿. This
harms the agent, particularly those with signi￿cant environmental concerns.
Moreover, the principal￿ s own emission reductions do not only serve as an
incentive instrument, but they also reduce her damage costs. As a consequence,
the principal may lower her own emissions so much that subsidies can even turn
negative (statement (ii)); especially for high types which bene￿t most from the
principal￿ s emission reductions. In the speci￿cation on which ￿gure 1 is based
(￿ = 0:25;a = 0:25), this is the case for types ￿ ’ 0:595.
14However, positive subsidies are necessary to get ine¢ cient types to sign be-
cause they bene￿t only little from the principal￿ s emission reductions. Therefore,
subsidies are positive if there is a su¢ cient probability mass of ine¢ cient types
￿for speci￿cation (23) and a = 1, if ￿ < ln2. Conversely, consider the limit-
ing case where all types are close to 1. Then proposing an (almost) e¢ cient
allocation increases the total surplus substantially above the non-cooperative
outcome, and the principal can use a negative subsidy to accrue the bulk of this
surplus, including a part of the agent￿ s gain from reduced emissions.
Not only the level but also the dynamics of the subsidy for interior solu-
tions depend on the type distribution. Moreover, although the distribution
has no impact on the out-of-contract allocation, it a⁄ects the critical type ￿m
and, therefore, the range of types for which the boundary and interior solution
applies.
Proposition 5
(i) Consider two hazard rates h1 (￿) and h2 (￿). The hazard rate h1 induces
higher emissions along the interior solution for type ￿, if and only if
h1 (￿) < h2 (￿).
(ii) Assuming equal bene￿t functions, the slope of subsidies along an interior
solution is determined by the hazard rate of the prior relative to the hazard




() _ s T 0: (30)
Both statements are related to the notion of hazard rate dominance: given
two densities, f1 dominates f2 i⁄
h(f1 (￿)) ￿ h(f2 (￿)) for all ￿: (31)
This means that the probability of observing an outcome within a neighbor-
hood of ￿, conditional on the outcome being no less than ￿, is smaller under
f1 than under f2 for all ￿s (by contrast, statement (i) considers individual ￿s).
Hazard rate dominance implies ￿rst order stochastic dominance of f1 over f2
and thus a higher expected value of ￿. Comparing a monotonic density function
f with the uniform distribution, then hazard rate dominance of f is equivalent
to _ f > 0, i.e., an optimistic prior. From the proposition it follows that the
"more optimistic" prior induces higher emissions along the interior (relaxed)
program for each type.
Intuitively, higher emissions along the relaxed program have two e⁄ects. On
the one hand, more low types will receive a boundary solution, for which overall
emissions are equal to those out-of-contract.7 Hence for these low types the
7Remember that the critical type ￿m is de￿ned as the highest type at which relaxed
program emissions intersect out-of-contract emissions from above (from proposition 2 and
(20)). If relaxed program emissions are higher for each type, then this intersection must be
further to the right.
15principal forgoes the bene￿ts that would result from internalizing the external-
ity. On the other hand, the principal has to pay a lower information rent to the
interior types, which follows straightforwardly from the dynamics of the infor-
mation rent (see 19). For a distribution that has less probability mass on low
types and more on high types, the second e⁄ect dominates so that emissions
increase.
Turning to statement (ii), remember that the highest type implements ef-
￿cient e⁄ort. Furthermore, we have just shown that for a distribution which
stochastically dominates the uniform one according to the hazard rate order
(i.e., h(￿) < (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1), the critical type ￿m lies further to the right. Accord-
ingly, emissions fall more rapidly in the interval [￿m;1] of interior types. Hence
underreporting of types is deterred by the associated stronger increase of emis-
sions. If this e⁄ect is strong enough, then the principal can even pay subsidies
that are lower for higher types.
The ￿nal non-standard result that obtains from the combination of multi-
lateral externalities and type dependent outside option concerns the principal￿ s
payo⁄.
Proposition 6 Although the optimal contract raises the principal￿ s expected
payo⁄ as compared to the out-of-contract solution, she may loose for e¢ cient
types.
Assuming speci￿cation (23) and a = 1, this happens for ￿￿ s close to 1 if
￿ < ln4 ￿1. In particular, the contract shown in ￿gure 2 assumes ￿ = 0:25; and
the principal￿ s gains over and above the out-of-contract payo⁄ turn negative
for ￿ > 0:87, even if only moderately. The reason is that e¢ cient types have
a high valuation for abatement and would choose low emissions even without
any bribe. This makes the laisser-faire state more attractive for the principal.
Moreover, in the contract state the agent￿ s incentive compatibility constraint
prevents the principal from stopping to subsidize e¢ cient types because they
would then pretend less e¢ ciency.
7 Concluding remarks
We have analysed a principal-agent model in an environment with multilateral
externalities. As a consequence, the principal can use her own emissions ￿
beside subsidies ￿to incentivize the agent. Moreover, both players￿fall-back
positions depend on the agent￿ s type. We have shown that the optimal contract
consists of an interior part and, possibly, also of a boundary part. The former is
described by the relaxed program with the usual property of no distortion at the
top. The boundary contract is an ￿ interior￿solution in the sense that it di⁄ers
from the out-of-contract allocation, although that allocation would be incentive
compatible and also satis￿es the agent￿ s participation constraint. However, the
principal can gain by allocating aggregate emissions between herself and the
agent in a cost-e¢ cient way.
16Our motivating example has been international environmental agreements
and, in particular, current e⁄orts to convince developing countries to accept
binding targets for greenhouse gas emissions. We will now discuss some of the
paper￿ s results in the context of this issue. Obviously, this should be done
with care because our model is a rather strong simpli￿cation of the extremely
complex climate negotiations (see the discussion in the introduction).
The ￿rst result is that the principal should condition her own emission reduc-
tions on those of the agent such that she reduces emissions more substantially
if the agent also does so (or, equivalently, if the agent states a high WTP). As
high WTP countries bene￿t most from the principal￿ s emission reductions, this
is a more e⁄ective instrument to separate agents along their type than subsidies.
In addition, the principal bene￿ts herself from her emission reductions, which
is not the case for subsidies. Interestingly, this nexus between own and foreign
emission reductions is often used in the context of international environmental
agreements. For example, the European Union has o⁄ered to increase its emis-
sion reductions from 20% to 30% (of 1990 levels by 2020), on condition that
other major emitting countries in the developed and developing worlds commit
to do their fair share under a global climate agreement.8
Second, the above argument suggests that subsidies play a much smaller
role to incentivize the agent than in the standard model without multilateral
externalities. Emission reductions are often a better means of incentive pay-
ment. This may rationalize why monetary compensations are rarely used in
international environmental agreements.
Third, the optimal contract allocates abatement cost-e⁄ectively; in the in-
terior, as well as along the boundary solution. Therefore, the lower relative
abatement costs in the group of developing countries (the agent), the lower the
share of emission reductions that should be overtaken by the group of indus-
trialized countries. This limits the extent to which the principal can use her
own emission reductions as an incentive instrument. Accordingly, the larger her
abatement cost relative to those of the agent, the more "standard" the contract
should become, involving, in particular, subsidies that are positive and rising in
the agent￿ s type. Given the substantial di⁄erences in abatement costs for green-
house gases, this suggests that substantial payments may be necessary to induce
the meaningful participation of developing countries, be it by direct monetary
payments or other forms of compensation such as technology transfers.
Fourth, there exists an alternative implementation of the optimal contract
allocation by competitive permit markets. This equivalence follows from the
cost e¢ cient allocation of emissions under competitive permit trading, and the
fact that the initial allocation of permit endowments allows to replicate the
subsidies of the contract. This alternative seems highly policy relevant because
international permit trading features prominently in political and theoretical
debates about climate policies.
The results that have been derived with speci￿cation (23) are robust for
8Several other countries have made similar conditional pledges, e.g. Australia, New
Zealand, Norway and Russia (see www.iccgov.org/policy-2_mitigation.htm).
17simple variations of the model such as quadratic damage cost functions9, or ac-
counting for a di⁄erent size of the agent (the mentioned examples are available
upon request). However, there certainly exists substantial scope for more fun-
damental modi￿cations, such as a more equal distribution of bargaining power,
multilateral asymmetric information and more than two players. Obviously, the
price of such modi￿cations would be that the model becomes less tractable.
An increased reliance on numerical simulations, possibly with models that are
calibrated to a speci￿c example such as climate change, may constitute a way
out of this dilemma; albeit at the price of making results less transparent and
general.
Appendix
A1: Proof of Proposition 1
The (IR) constraint is a pure state constraint of the ￿rst order, because the
controls appear after di⁄erentiating,
_ U (￿) ￿ _ R(￿) = ￿D(x1 (￿) + x2 (￿)) ￿ _ R(￿): (32)
This fact can be used to apply the indirect method (see, e.g., Chiang (1992))
by replacing the state constraint (IR) by
_ U (￿) ￿ _ R(￿) whenever U (￿) = R(￿): (33)
Using this, the optimal control problem as stated before proposition 1 leads
to the Hamiltonian (￿(￿) is the costate of U (￿) and the arguments are dropped
from now on),
H = [B1 (x1) + B2 (x2) ￿ (1 + ￿)D(X) ￿ U]f ￿ ￿D(X); (34)
and the Lagrangean (￿(￿) is the Lagrangean multiplier)
L = H + ￿
￿
_ U ￿ _ R
￿
: (35)
9Indeed convex and in particular quadratic damages lead to even more pronounced e⁄ects
due to the resulting strategic choice of x0
1.




i ￿ (1 + ￿)D0]f ￿ (￿ + ￿)D0 = 0; i = 1;2; (36)




_ U = ￿D(x1 + x2); (38)
@L
@￿
= _ U ￿ _ R ￿ 0; ￿ ￿ 0; ￿
￿
_ U ￿ _ R
￿
= 0; (39)
U (￿) ￿ R(￿) ￿ 0; ￿[U (￿) ￿ R(￿)] = 0; (40)
_ ￿ ￿ 0 [= 0 when U (￿) > R(￿)]; (41)
￿(￿) ￿ 0; ￿(￿)(U (￿) ￿ R(￿)) = 0; (42)
￿(1) ￿ 0; ￿(1)(U (1) ￿ R(1)) = 0: (43)
Here, (37) and (38) are the standard di⁄erential equations for the co-state
and state variable. The complementary slackness condition (40) assures that
the constraint on the state variable (39) only applies when U (￿) ￿ R(￿) = 0.
(41) restricts the dynamics of the Lagrangean multiplier if the state constraint
binds. Finally, (42) and (43) are the transversality conditions which re￿ ect that
we have a truncated vertical initial and terminal line.
Moreover, using (IC) and (13)










so that (39) can be stated alternatively as
X0 (￿) ￿ X (￿) ￿ 0; ￿ ￿ 0; ￿
￿
X0 (￿) ￿ X (￿)
￿
= 0: (45)
Statement (i) follows straightforwardly from (36). Turning to statement (iv),
at a boundary solution ￿(￿) > 0 so that Xb (￿) = X0 (￿) from (45). Individual
emissions will usually di⁄er because only in the contract solution they are chosen
to equalize marginal bene￿ts.
Next, we analyse the transversality conditions, for which there are di⁄er-
ent combinations of binding and non-binding state constraints at the lowest
and highest type. First, suppose ￿(1) > 0. From (43), U (1) = R(1) so
that Xb (1) = X0 (1) by Proposition 1(iv). However, at ￿ = 1 from (36),
[B0
i ￿ 2D0]f = [￿(1) + ￿(1)]D0 > 0 so that Xb (1) < X1 (1) < X0 (1), a con-
tradiction. Hence ￿(1) = 0 so that the contract does not bind at the highest
type.
Using ￿(1) = 0, integration of the costate di⁄erential equation (37) over the
interval [￿;1] leads to ￿(￿) = F(￿) ￿ 1. Thus, assuming in addition ￿(￿) = 0
leads to a contradiction since then ￿(￿) = F(￿) after integration of (37) over
the interval [￿;￿]. Accordingly, ￿(￿) < 0 and the contract binds at the lowest
type.
19Using the above, statement (iii) follows straightforwardly. In particular,








D0 = 0; i = 1;2; (46)
where ￿(￿) = 0 for interior solutions as given in (16). By the curvature assump-
tions, no such interior solution can exist for g(￿) ￿ ￿1. Hence in this case ￿(￿)
must become positive to satisfy (46) and a boundary solution obtains. This
leads to the following equivalences,
￿(￿) > 0 () B0
i > (1 + g(￿))D0 () xb
i (￿) < xr
i (￿); (47)
and thus to emissions below the relaxed program along a boundary solution.
Turning to (ii), observe that g(￿) ￿ ￿ with equality i⁄ ￿ = 1 (see 17). More-
over, ￿(￿) ￿ 0 with equality at interior solutions that include ￿ = 1 (from the
preceding analysis). Hence, for interior solutions comparing the conditions that
determine emissions with a contract (16) and in the ￿rst-best solution (2) shows
that emissions are above the ￿rst-best except at the top. For boundary solu-
tions, overall emissions equal those in the out-of-contract solution and, therefore,
are above the ￿rst-best. This must also be the case for individual emissions of
the principal and the agent because emissions are chosen to equalize marginal
bene￿ts with contracts and in the ￿rst-best solution.
For the second statement in (ii) we use again the fact that contract emissions





































For interior solutions (￿(￿) = 0), _ xi < 0 follows immediately from _ g > 1 and
the curvature assumptions. For boundary solutions, observe that sign(_ x1) =
sign(_ x2). Moreover, by proposition 1(iv) overall emissions are the same as in
the out-of-contract solution, which are decreasing in ￿ (by (5) and _ x1 = 0).
Hence also at the boundary _ xi < 0;i = 1;2. ￿
A2: Proof of Proposition 2
The Hamiltonian is concave in the controls (i.e., in the emissions xi) over the
relevant domain,
B00
i f ￿ [(1 + ￿)f + ￿ + ￿]D00 < 0; i = 1;2; (49)
because [(1 + ￿)f + ￿ + ￿]D0 = B0
if > 0 from (36) for positive emissions, and is
thus also jointly concave given the linearity in the state. Moreover, the control
problem with objective (14) and ￿ dynamic￿(IC) and (pure) ￿ state￿constraint
20(IR) satis￿es the regularity condition (Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, 165), con-
dition (6.17)), i.e., the ￿ matrix￿
￿
￿D0 ￿D0 U ￿ R
￿
(50)
has the maximal rank of 1 in the interior and along the boundary since D0 > 0.
Therefore, the controls must be continuous for all types (Feichtinger and Hartl
1986, 167), including the marginal type ￿m, which yields (21).
For statement (i) it remains to prove that ￿m separates the contract in the
sense that a boundary solution obtains for all ￿ ￿ ￿m and an interior one for
all ￿ > ￿m. If there is a unique intersection of aggregate relaxed program
emissions, Xr, with aggregate out-of-contract emissions, X0, then this follows
straightforwardly from the discussion in the main text. Hence, consider the
(unlikely) case of multiple intersections between Xr and X0; and suppose that
an interior solution (for which ￿ = 0) is followed by a boundary solution (for
which ￿ > 0) . This requires that _ ￿ > 0 at least for some ￿, in contradiction to
(41).
Summarizing, the solution as described in propositions 1 and 2 satis￿es all
￿rst-order conditions (36) to (43), which are also su¢ cient given that the reg-
ularity condition holds and that the (maximized) Hamiltonian is concave with
respect to the state U.
Statement (ii) follows straightforwardly from the fact that Xb = X0 for all
￿ ￿ ￿m (by proposition 1), and that ￿m is the highest type at which aggregate
relaxed program emissions, Xr, which prevail in the interior, cross aggregate
out-of-contract emissions, X0, from above.
Statement (iii) follows immediately for boundary solutions because they are
characterized by Xb = X0 and equalization of marginal abatement costs. Turn-
ing to interior solutions, an example which proves that the principal￿ s contract
emissions may exceed their out-of-contract level is given in section 6. Modi-
fying this speci￿cation by assuming quadratic damages, a Stackelberg setup,
a = 2;￿ = 0:5;f (￿) linearly increasing, and f (￿) = 0:5 leads to the equivalent
result for the agent￿ s emissions (a detailed solution of this example is available
upon request from the authors). ￿
A3: Proof of Proposition 4
Rearranging (12), the dynamics of the subsidy are
_ s = ￿B0
2 (x2 (￿)) _ x2 + ￿D0(X (￿))(_ x1 + _ x2) (51)
= ￿_ x2 [B0
2 (x2 (￿)) ￿ 2￿D0(X (￿))] + ￿D0(X (￿))(_ x1 ￿ _ x2). (52)
Moreover, for a uniform distribution g(￿) = 2￿ ￿ 1. Accordingly, along the
relaxed program the ￿rst term in (52) is zero (by 16). Statement (i) then follows
straightforwardly from (48), according to which the sign of _ x1 ￿ _ x2 is equal to
the sign of B00
2 (xr
1 (￿)) ￿ B00
1 (xr
2 (￿)).
Turning to statement (ii), along a boundary solution overall emissions are
the same as in the out-of-contract solution, but marginal abatement costs are
21equalized. Therefore, if the agent￿ s contract emissions fall below those out-of-
contract, he must be compensated by a positive subsidy - and vice versa. More









and X0 (￿) = Xb (￿) yields





















From proposition 2(iii) this expression can be positive or negative. Given
that emissions are continuous, negative subsidies in the left neighborhood of ￿m
(boundary contract) imply that these are also negative in the right neighborhood
of ￿m (interior contract). The same argument applies to positive subsidies.
Alternatively, the result can be proved by solving speci￿cation (23), which yields
that s(￿) = ￿￿ + ln2: ￿
A4: Proof of Proposition 5









Lowering the hazard rate lowers the right-hand side in the relaxed program.
Thus, the positive ￿rst term on the left-hand side must becomes smaller. By
the curvature assumptions, this requires higher emissions; possibly exceeding
the out-of-contract emissions that are independent of assumptions about the
distribution.
Turning to statement (ii), the assumption of equal bene￿t functions and the
equalization of marginal bene￿ts in the optimal contract imply x1 = x2 and
_ X = 2_ x2. Upon substitution into (51),
_ s = ￿_ x2 [B0
2 (x2 (￿)) ￿ 2￿D0(X)]
Substitution for B0
2 (x2 (￿)) from the relaxed program condition (16) yields
that along the relaxed program
_ s = ￿_ x2 [(1 + g (￿)) ￿ 2￿]D0(Xr):
From (17), 1+g (￿)￿2￿ = 1+￿￿ 1
h(￿). Hence _ s > 0 if this term is positive.
￿
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24Appendix B: Algebraic solution of example (23)






is independent of the principal￿ s emission. Therefore, the Cournot and Stackel-
berg solutions coincide, and the principal￿ s emissions are simply10
x0
1 = 1: (56)
For a uniform distribution, g(￿) = 2￿ ￿ 1. Hence the relaxed program (16)





















which requires a < 1 and a su¢ ciently small lower bound ￿. Furthermore, if
there are types ￿ > ￿ that satisfy (58), then there exists a unique type




at which aggregate relaxed program emissions, Xr, cross aggregate out-of-
contract emissions, X0. Moreover, di⁄erentiating emissions yields
_ Xr = ￿
1 + a
2￿





so that _ Xr < _ X0 for any a < 1, which is necessary for a unique intersection
from above. Accordingly, for types ￿ ￿ ￿m a boundary solution obtains, for
















The subsidies that are required to implement the emission targets for bound-
ary and interior solutions are (assuming that ￿IR = 1￿a
2 > ￿)11
sb (￿) = aln
1 + a
a + ￿
> 0 for ￿ ￿ ￿IR; (62)






for ￿ > ￿IR: (63)
10This depends, of course, crucially on the linear damage function. With convex damages,
the principal has a strong incentive to choose much higher emissions in the Stackelberg set up
because that reduces the agent￿ s emissions free of charge for the principal.
11Subsidies along the boundary follow from substituting the above emission levels into the
identity U = R. Subsidies along the interior follow from U = V2 + s and integrating (IC) to










25Di⁄erentiation yields that subsidies are always declining with respect to the





so that subsidies are declining if the agent has lower abatement costs (a < 1).
Considering a concrete case, say ￿ = 1=4 and a = 1=4, the boundary contract
(61) is applied for all ￿ ￿ 0:375 = ￿m and the relaxed program (57) for the
remaining types.
For an alternative permit contract one can also calculate the endowment
allocated to the agent as (using 27)











The endowment must exceed after-trade emissions (!2 > xr
2) in order to
deliver the necessary transfers.
In the main text we have claimed that for speci￿cation (23) and a = 1
subsidies are positive if ￿ < ln2. This can be shown as follows. For a = 1, the
subsidy is constant and the relaxed program de￿nes the solution for all ￿; hence
we cannot simply use (63). However, it su¢ ces to calculate the subsidy for ￿,
for which the participation constraint binds so that
B2 (xr
























= ￿￿ + ln2: (68)
In order to show that the principal can loose from contracting with certain
types, we calculate for speci￿cation (23) the principal￿ s payo⁄ from a type ￿ in
the out-of-contract solution,













where the subscript 1 refers to the principal in order to di⁄erentiate from the
agent, and with contracts (using the constant subsidy (68))
U1 (￿) = B1 (xr
1 (￿)) ￿ D(Xr (￿)) ￿ s(￿) = ￿ln￿ ￿
1
￿
+ ￿ ￿ 2ln2: (70)
Hence the principal￿ s gain from contracts is
U1 (￿) ￿ R1 (￿) = ￿ln￿ ￿
1
￿




12This follows from solving the local incentive constraint (i.e., (12) evaluated at ^ ￿ = ￿) for
_ s(￿). Obviously, if a boundary part exists (i.e., if ￿IR = 1￿a
2 > ￿) it also follows directly from
di⁄erentiation of (63).
26Figure 3: Agent￿ s contracted emissions (xb
2;xr
2) can exceed their out-of-contract
level (x0
2): quadratic damages, Stackelberg setup, a = 2;￿ = 0:5;f (￿) linearly
increasing, f (￿) = 0:5.
which decreases in ￿ but increases in ￿. Accordingly, the highest ￿ such that
the principal looses at least from a contract with the highest type, ￿ = 1, is
￿ = 2ln2 ￿ 1 ￿ 0:386. ￿ (72)
Appendix C: Example which illustrates statement
that also the agent￿ s emissions may exceed their
out-of-contract level
From the discussion in text, the following properties favour such a case: (i)
high abatement costs of the agent (e.g., a > 1 in the simple speci￿cation (23)),
(ii) low ￿s, and (iii) large out-of-contract emissions of the principal, e.g., due
to the Stackelberg outcome and convex damages. In such cases a reallocation
of emissions to the agent can increase total welfare. Fig. 3 shows an example
along these lines, where the agent￿ s contract emissions exceed his no contract
allocation (albeit mostly in a small domain), both along the boundary and
interior part of the optimal contract.
27Appendix D: Sensitivity analysis
The purpose of this Appendix is to document that the results are by no means
sensitive to the chosen simple speci￿cation. Moreover, the ￿rst charts comple-
ment graphically the example already discussed in the paper.
D1: Illustration of examples from main text
Figs. 4 and 5 show emissions (interior and boundary) payo⁄s and subsidies
corresponding to the example in Fig. 1. Aggregate emissions in the relaxed
program exceed those outside a contract for types ￿ < 0:375 = ￿m (see Fig. 4).
Fig. 5 shows the corresponding subsidies, which have the unusual properties of
being declining (see propositions 4 and 5) and turning negative for high types
￿ at the claimed level (see p. 14). This means that high types which choose
low emissions are ￿ penalized￿by negative subsidies, while higher emissions fetch
higher and positive subsidies (unless emissions are so high that they violated the
participation constraint). Nevertheless, high types are deterred from cheating
by underreporting their willingness to pay because this would trigger higher
emissions by the principal, hurting the agent.
D2: Linear and increasing densities
Figs 6-8 are based on an alternative example with identical bene￿ts (a = 1),
which simpli￿es the plots compared with the reference example above due to
symmetric allocation of emissions within a contract. However, the inclusion of
an ￿ interior boundary￿contract requires a distribution di⁄erent from the uniform
one. Thus a linearly increasing density is used with the mode at ￿ = 1, i.e.,
ine¢ cient types are relatively rare. Interestingly, the opposite of a pessimistic
prior with the mode at ￿ implies a global interior contract. Although, one
can characterize the outcome still in closed form, ￿gures provide a much more
informative picture because of cumbersome formulas (e.g., a cubic equation
determines ￿m).
Fig. 6 plots the crucial elements g and h highlighting that the relaxed pro-
gram cannot exist at small levels of ￿ since g < ￿1. Fig. 7 shows the emissions,















. Finally, Fig. 8
shows the agent￿ s payo⁄s and subsidies on the left-hand side, and subsidies con-
tingent on the agent￿ s emission on the right-hand side. The latter is only a
projection of the three-dimensional optimal incentive scheme because that in-
cludes in addition the crucial commitment of the principal to match the agent￿ s
emissions.
28Figure 4: Emissions for (23) with ￿ = 1
4, and a = 1
4. Optimal contract emissions
(bold and asterisks), ￿rst best and out-of-contract.
Figure 5: Agent￿ s payo⁄s for (23) & incentive scheme, ￿ = 1
4, and a = 1
4
29Figure 6: Linearly increasing densities: ￿= 1
4 and f(￿) = 1
2 =) f(1) = 13=6.
No relaxed program exists for g ￿ ￿1 since that would require B0
i ￿ 0.
Figure 7: Example (23) except for probability distribution function from Fig.
6, and a = 1.
30Figure 8: Payo⁄and subsidies (s) for example (23), a = 1, but distribution from
Fig. 6, ￿= 1
4 and f(￿) = 1
2.
D3: Scaling the Size of the Agent
Both players have identical bene￿t (B increasing and concave satisfying the
Inada conditions) from individual emissions (xi;i = 1;2) but face the damage
(D increasing and convex) depending on aggregate emissions. Hence
Vi = Ai [B (xi) ￿ ￿iD(Aixi + Ajxj)];i = 1;2;j 6= i; (73)
where Ai is the size and the principal￿ s size is normalized, A1 = 1. As a
consequence, the ￿rst-best as well as the relaxed program emissions are identical,
xr
1 = xr
2. Fig. 9 shows a corresponding example for a larger agent A > 1 (but
saving here on the computation of the boundary strategy) and the interpretation
is analogue to the one in the paper (for a < 1).
D4: Quadratic damages
Alternatively, consider quadratic damages, identical size and uniform distribu-
tion,
B (xi) = ln(xi); D(X) =
1
2


















































31Figure 9: Emissions for example (23) but payo⁄ (74), ￿= 1
4 and larger agent
(A = 3
2).













































and the integral can be even analytically computed. However, trying to solve
this ￿rst-order condition, implies a high order polynomial that yields a clumsy
solution which is not worth reporting. Therefore, consider the example ￿ = 1=4
for which x0














1 + 4=￿d￿; (81)







































for which no closed form solution (not even a clumsy one) could be obtained.
Therefore, considering the above example, ￿ = 1=4, the corresponding Cournot
emission is x0
1 = 0:5997 and thus substantially below the Stackelberg outcome
for the reason given in the main text.
Given the principal￿ s emission x0



























and the principal￿ s reservation price is,









































Fig. 10 shows an example.
The agent￿ s payo⁄ follows from integrating the incentive compatibility con-
straint using the reservation price from (84) at ￿ as the initial condition,
U (￿) = U (￿) ￿
￿ Z
￿











































33Figure 10: Quadratic damages: Emissions e¢ cient (dashing), without a contract
and optimal mechanism (bold) for ￿ = 1
4.
are constant.
The quadratic damage case is particularly suited to demonstrate that the
principal can loose from contracts with e¢ cient types. This follows from compar-
ing the principal￿ s gain under the optimal contract over and above no contract
outcome (see Fig. 11).
34Figure 11: Quadratic damages: Principal￿ s gain from contracts as a function of
the agent￿ s types for di⁄erent values of ￿:
35